Apr 09 2008
Chaos Theory
Ed Morrissey on Iran’s intentions:
This will come as a shock to those who keep believing that Shi’ites and Sunnis cannot cooperate in terrorist activities. Of course, the intelligence and military communities already know that Iran funds AQI as well as the Mahdi Army, mostly to destabilize the elected government of Iraq. They want a theocracy headed by their puppet Moqtada al-Sadr, but they’ll settle for a failed state they can control through violence and collapse.
The Iran/AQI stuff aside, I think Captain Ed raises an interesting point about Iran’s goals in Iraq. There’s some disagreement emerging over this in various intellectual and pundity circle, and I wonder if the line basically falls between those who favor occupation and those who do not. Either way, while I agree with Ed on Iran’s desired endgame, I don’t think we should assume that a “failed state” works to their advantage. As I noted yesterday, there’s plenty of reason to believe that Iran’s intentions for Iraq are the same as our own (in the short term, that is). It makes sense for Iran to support chaos in places like Palestine, because it serves their purposes in the PR war they’ve waged upon the Israelis (Arab regimes have also popularized this tactic). But when it comes to their own front door, well, not so much. A failed Iraqi state likely means a prolonged American presence, which must cause angina in Tehran and Qom.
It’s also inaccurate to assume that al-Sadr supports a failed state. One of his primary contentions with the ISCI/Badr faction is that they support a soft partition plan, something he vehemently opposes. While he’s certainly a loyal Shiite, he’s also a nationalist coming from a country with a strong Pan-Arabist tradition. He doesn’t need instability to rule in Iraq, since he’s already an immensely popular figure. A fractured Iraq would hurt his ambitions, and really wouldn’t benefit Iran, either.
UPDATE:
I guess a better point is that Iran has options we will simply never have. I think David Ignatius gets it:
The Iranians have fixed the political game. They are on all sides at once. They have links to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Dawa party; they funnel money to the Badr organization of Shiite cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, which is a key recruiting ground for the Iraqi army; they provide weapons, training and command and control for the most extreme factions of the Mahdi Army. Moqtada al-Sadr, the Mahdi Army’s nominal leader, is actually living in the Iranian holy city of Qom, suffering from what intelligence sources believe may be clinical depression. A useful ploy would be to invite him to come home and see if he can be drawn into negotiations.
The Iranians were able to start the recent trouble in Basra and Baghdad through one set of operatives, then negotiate a cease-fire through another. In short, they play the Iraqi lyre on all its strings.
Fighting a war against Iran is a bad idea. But fighting a proxy war against it in Iraq, where many of our key allies are manipulated by Iranian networks of influence, may be even worse. The best argument for keeping American troops in Iraq is that it increases our leverage against Iran; but paradoxically, that’s also a good argument for reducing U.S. troops to a level that’s politically and militarily sustainable. It could give America greater freedom to maneuver in the tests with Iran that are ahead.
Comical aside: The thought of a depressed Moqtada al-Sadr writing sullen “dear diary” entries.
Seems to me though, that all of those players (the Iranians, al Sadr, etc) do have the goal of fomenting some degree of organized chaos (chaos which they can still control) with the overall strategy of undermining our efforts to achieve stability. The idea there would be to use the US domestic political scene to their advantage, so that a degree of chaos which they control and we can’t will eventually lead to US withdrawal.
If Iran were to help us pacify Iran, centralize the oil and build a democracy, al-Sadr could waltz in, and win elections if he wanted to (but we also know that power in Shi’a communities stems from multiple sources, not requiring government office).
Again, I think whatever gets us OUT faster is ideal for Tehran, so the question to me then becomes what gets thatdone faster. Perhaps you’re right–maybe Iran is counting on weak will in America, but I think some faux cooperation with us could ALSO favor them (and also take the heat off of their nuclear activity).
Well, as you said, al Sadr doesn’t need instability in order to rule in Iraq- but he does need the US to stop supporting Maliki, no?
And as for Iran calculating on when to start the fires and when to put them out, couldn’t there be an element of that calculation in al Sadr standing down (which according to some sources, was done on advice of his Iranian backers?)
It seems to me that this is a game that we can’t win, so we have to figure out a way to not play. I think one reason that we’ve tried to expose all of the Iranian connections is to show the world community and our domestic anti-war crowd that Iran is setting up a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ scenario, so that when they create a situation that makes it look like we’re losing, we can manage the perceptions that result from that.
We have serious issues to resolve with Iran that don’t even relate to Iraq, but Iraq is our biggest project of the new century. It is our Apollo project, or whatever else you can liken it to. Iran will always be a part of Iraq, but like you said, we need to find a way to minimize their overall influence in the region, or at least control the spin on it. Fostering pluralism and secular law in Iraq qould be a good start, but me getting a million dollars would also be pretty neat.
Sadr is a threat to DAWA and SCIRI(former) and will probably gain seats and more political power in upcoming election. Some suspect this as a big reason for the Basra operation. Could Maliki try to outlaw Sadr’s political party/politicians?
Could Maliki try to outlaw Sadr’s political party/politicians?
I think this is what he’s essentially trying to do now, Rudi. Asking that "all" militias disarm, etc.
In the context of the Iranians, I wonder if they really care? Again, I think the republic is more invested in al-Sadr than they are in his current political organization. If Maliki’s people are open to
servingworking with them, I think they’d be fine going that route.