Juan Cole on Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki’s Basra assault:

And then there is the super-province. On the same day that Bergner spoke, a Sadrist leader told the Times of Baghdad, “The objective of the operations in Basra is to impose a provincial confederacy on the south, which the Sadr Movement opposes.” The reference to a provincial confederacy, confusingly called “federalism” in Iraq, is to the plan of ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim to establish an eight-province regional government for the Shiite south. Were the Sadrists to win the southern provinces in October’s provincial elections, they would halt any move toward such a confederacy, since they favor strong central government on the French model and view al-Hakim’s plan for a Shiite super-province as the first stage in a soft partition of Iraq.

The issue of whether to create a Shiite super-province and risk a soft partition of Iraq is not the only source of conflict between the Sadrists and the Iraqi government. The Sadr Movement demands the setting of a timetable for the departure of U.S. troops, a demand supported by a majority of the members of parliament but which is not shared by most ministers in the Iraqi cabinet.

It isn’t difficult to figure out why it is that al-Sadr might support a strong and centralized Iraq.  I’m sure he’d rather impose a faqih style of government on all of Iraq, rather than a few of her parts. 

That aside, I think we’re getting too far into meta-Iraq talk when we say that Maliki is trying to build the Shi’a super-state through last week’s actions.  As Reidar Visser–one of the best resources alive on matters pertaining to Basra and southern Iraq–noted, Maliki has been fighting with the ISCI over centralized power and security; while even some of the Sadrists in Basra have remained somewhat ambivalent about the so-called super-province.  Not to say that the theories Cole raises are entirely spurious, but they seem like a less likely motivation for direct confrontation with just the Sadr movement.

Whatever the reason, it seems to make strategic sense–as well as good Iraqi policy–to snuff out Sadr’s military influence in the region (obviously easier said than done, but allowing it to fester and grow will only make the task harder in years to come).  Sadr’s victory over the weekend didn’t have to do so much with the provincial elections this year, although they’re a part of it.  By safely playing the role of power-broker and prophet in Iran, Sadr has taken on a Nasrallah, or even a Khomeini-like role in Iraq.  We know that Sadr has been placed on the clerical fast track, and a Sadrist political takeover of the south would only embolden his cause in the region.

Much like in Lebanon, where a terrorist organization is permitted to stifle democratic progress both electorally and militarily, the Sadr organization will be able to prevent the central Iraqi government from becoming too west friendly, or too “westoxicated.”  They’ll be able to do this with bullets and ballots, making them a difficult force to topple in Iraq. 

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