While pundits and other observers wait to see if Barack Obama’s ‘post-partisan’ message can translate into a new era of Democratic politics, there is a quiet revolution taking place within the Republican Party. It’s not the upstart candidacy of Mike Huckabee, nor is it the establishment candidacy of Mitt Romney. As these two fight over the support of their party’s base, the campaign of Rudolph Giuliani seeks to win nomination by shattering the carefully constructed conservative coalition that has dominated Republican politics for over forty years.

Out of the ashes of Barry Goldwater’s failed attempt to unseat President Lyndon Johnson came a movement of intelligent and energized conservatives who, as reported by columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, were “seizing power, displacing the eastern party chiefs.” Indeed, through direct mail, grassroots organization and conservative publications, these children of Goldwater were taking a party once regionally and intellectually based within the business interests of the northeast, and re-rooting it in the socially conservative Mountain and Southern states of the nation.

Richard Viguerie–a pioneer in direct mail fundraising–was one of those young activists. He has warned and petitioned against Giuliani’s candidacy, recently telling the Concord Monitor that “he’s wrong on every single social issue,” and under the mayor’s stewardship, “the Republican Party will be unrecognizable.” And it would be, at least as far as the party’s base is concerned. The thought of a socially liberal adulterer, with a weak record on all of the hot button base issues, getting the nomination must startle Republicans like Viguerie.

It wasn’t always this way. Prior to the ascendance of Goldwater, there had been a constant battle between the liberal pragmatists and Old Guard conservatives who had spent decades fighting for control of Lincoln’s party. This fight went to the floor of the 1952 Republican convention, where the pro-Eisenhower forces of Thomas Dewey and the liberal GOP fought to keep the nomination away from Bob Taft and the conservatives. Thanks to the general’s war record and iconic appeal, the liberal wing won. They would continue to win until Goldwater came upon the national scene. The Arizona senator’s nomination dispensed with the pragmatism of previous presidential elections, and helped foster the activist infrastructure of today’s Republican Party.

Giuliani’s nomination would radically change the king making process of the post-Goldwater conservatives. The Florida strategy–as Giuliani’s electoral plan has loosely been referred–maps out a way to subvert the more narrow and socially conservative interests within the party, and instead envisions a route through larger Republican primary states, with the priority being delegates rather than statewide “wins.” If he succeeds, America’s mayor will have done what he always set out to do–run for the national nomination from day one. Taking advantage of a frontloaded primary season, Giuliani hopes to win the Republican popular vote, as opposed to the momentum-focused races in early states like Iowa and New Hampshire.

Conservatives should take solace in the uphill battle Rudy has before him. Recent Rasmussen Reports polling shows the mayor falling to third in the crucial state of Florida, and a resurgent John McCain seems to have Rudy withdrawing his efforts in New Hampshire. In addition to recent campaign troubles, the seemingly endless list of scandals–most recently the alleged misuse of city funds for escorting mistresses–have only diminished the chances of a candidate hoping to sell voters on his ability to “get it done” when the “getting” is most necessary. If a candidate’s finest quality is their ability to lead, than they must display solid judgment. Giuliani has been bedeviled at times by this in his personal life. Politically speaking, he may be making the same electoral mistakes as his liberal predecessor Dewey. At one time the assumptive favorite to defeat Truman in 1948, Dewey never properly articulated his contrasts with the 33rd president. He hoped his supposed electability–along with the disapproval of a sitting president and ineffective Congress–would carry him into the White House. He was wrong then, and the often sanguine and prosaic Giuliani may very well be wrong now. He has taken criticism for lackluster debate performances, while often getting too bogged down in the minutia of particular issues.

But Giuliani still has something Dewey never possessed, and that’s the ability to coalesce Republicans, Democrats and Independents around one binding issue. It’s a path Dewey refused to take the country down regarding the security crisis of his time–Communism. Not content to “shoot an idea with a gun,” Dewey often found himself to Truman’s Left on what would emerge as one of the most salient issues of the 1950’s. Rudy holds no such reservations, and if victorious, he will have cleverly convinced a party preoccupied with terrorism and security to give liberalism another chance.

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